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Rising demand from cellphones and other wireless products has
highlighted Canada’s scarcity of spectrum space. Reforms could
liberalize the allocation of spectrum with a market-based approach,
enhance efficiency and increase competition. 
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ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INNOVATIONThe global proliferation of wireless technology and rising demand for wireless products is
straining the capacity of government spectrum allocation systems to keep pace. In Canada, as
elsewhere, the ubiquity of cellphones, combined with the growth of such products as wireless
emergency responders and television services using wireless technology, has transformed the
distribution of limited spectrum space from an arcane technical issue relevant to
telecommunications and broadcasting experts to a matter of great national interest. 
This Commentary provides recommendations for Canadian policy change that will improve
spectrum use for the benefit of consumers and other end users.
Spectrum allocation policy reform in Canada is becoming increasingly urgent as new forms
of technology change how spectrum is used and as valuable spectrum space soon to be
vacated by analog television broadcasts becomes available. 
While spectrum reform and renewal is well underway around the world, Canada’s approach
to date has been cautious. Indeed, auctions that competitively assign spectrum are
commonplace around the world, but are nascent in Canada. Meanwhile, Canada also lags
behind the market-based initiatives of other countries, notably Australia, the United
Kingdom and the United States.
We recommend a number of reforms for spectrum policy in Canada that would liberalize the
allocation system, increase efficiency, and introduce greater competition. 
First, Industry Canada, which has sole responsibility for management of the spectrum
resource, should rely increasingly on spectrum auctions, as they are the best means of
assigning scarce spectrum.
Second, it should apply prices to spectrum to better reflect the opportunity cost of holding
that spectrum. Releasing underutilized and surplus spectrum for commercial use would
generate government revenues and improve competition, leading to lower wireless prices for
consumers. 
Third, Industry Canada should allow spectrum holders greater flexibility to trade and change
the aggregation of their spectrum in secondary markets. This will better allocate spectrum to
its most valued use no matter who purchases it initially through an auction. 
Lastly, Industry Canada should focus its regulation of spectrum on reducing signal
interference while allowing greater common usage of allocated spectrum.
ABOUTTHE INSTITUTE
The C.D. Howe Institute is a leading independent, economic and social policy research institution. The
Institute promotes sound policies in these fields for all Canadians through its research and
communications. Its nationwide activities include regular policy roundtables and presentations by policy
staff in major regional centres, as well as before parliamentary committees. The Institute’s individual and
corporate members are drawn from business, universities and the professions across the country.




is Professor and Director





ADRIAN FOSTER is a
CMC and partner with





Rigorous external review 
of every major policy study,
undertaken by academics 
and outside experts, helps
ensure the quality,
integrity and objectivity 
of the Institute’s research.
$12.00
ISBN 978-0-88806-804-0
ISSN 0824-8001 (print); 
ISSN 1703-0765 (online)
THE STUDY IN BRIEFCommentary 303 | 1
P
ersonal communications using
wireless technology are of vital
importance in Canada, where 99
percent of the population relies on cellular
coverage. That reliance can be more than 
a matter of simple convenience. If a
traveller is stranded on an isolated high-
way in the middle of a storm, rescuers can
use various radio services, including
cellular communications, trunked radio
systems (fire and ambulance services) and
global position systems to come to the
traveller’s aid.
Significantly increased demand for such wireless
products has strained the outmoded government-
run system of spectrum allocation to users and has
resulted in gridlock that has artificially constrained
supply and driven up prices in the wireless
communications market. 
In this Commentary, we demonstrate how the
spectrum gridlock problem has arisen. To do so,
we analyze the Canadian 2008 Advanced Wireless
Services (AWS) auction, which helps to locate the
gridlock problem within the overall spectrum
management regime. This enables us to suggest
policy choices that will broaden the effort to
increase competition and complement existing
market-based mechanisms such as auctions or the
use of set-asides of spectrum for particular users.
Ultimately, we advocate changes to Canadian radio
spectrum management policy that will lead to
improvements in how radio spectrum is accessed
and used, and ultimately, result in benefits for
Canadian consumers.
The physics underlying electromagnetic
radiation, spectrum policy and spectrum
management remains a distant abstraction for all
but a few Canadians. Even so, recent radio
spectrum auctions such as the AWS auction for
cellular phone services and the US 700 MHz band
auction completed in 2008 for spectrum
previously used by analog television broadcasts – a
precursor to a similar auction to be conducted in
Canada in the near future – brought welcome
public attention to the issue.1
The Canadian AWS auction raised $4.26 billion
for 105 megahertz (MHz) of radio spectrum, with
licences awarded to two classes of bidders:
incumbents that already provide wireless services;
and new entrants. While some have described the
auction as a success, criticism has been levelled in
two areas. First, critics pointed to the policy-based
preference for new entrants, who received an
advantage in that they were provided with a set-
aside of spectrum that only they could bid on. As
well, critics alleged that auction design flaws
resulted in higher than expected prices.
Properly designed auctions are a necessary and
effective tool for assigning spectrum. Much of the
effort to design better auctions, as with standard
applications of antitrust regulation, is intended to
thwart unfortunate bidder tendencies: collusion,
barriers to entry and exercise of market power. 
However, the underlying challenge facing
spectrum management in Canada goes beyond
auction design. Current administrative methods,
whereby the government manages and determines
spectrum allocation and use, exacerbate rather
than diminish spectrum scarcity. As a result, 
these methods can introduce gridlock into the
process of making spectrum available to meet
demands for new services. Further, they create
conditions of scarcity that can be exploited in
auctions by companies bidding strategically 
to defend their turf. 
The Background
Radio spectrum (hereafter referred to as spectrum)
is a subset of the electromagnetic waves lying
between the frequencies nine kilohertz (kHz –
thousands of cycles per second) to 300 gigahertz
(GHz – billions of cycles per second). Spectrum
supports a wide range of business, personal,
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The authors wish to sincerely thank Björn Wellenius, Ian Munro, and Stuart MacPherson for their valuable comments and suggestions. 
1 Industry Canada, the Canadian government department responsible for spectrum management, completed an auction for AWS licences in
2008. In 10 years, auctions have raised almost $6 billion. The 700 MHz band auction in the US was the largest in its history collecting over US
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industrial, scientific, medical and cultural
activities, both public and private. 
Ensuring that radio systems, especially public-
safety radio, function properly is a major concern
of spectrum managers. In Canada, Industry
Canada has this responsibility.2 The framework
for spectrum management has centred on the
need to regulate in a way that reduces signal
interference and guarantees that bands are
available for public-sector uses. While this
approach does not imply that growing private-
sector needs are neglected, it generally presumes
that regulatory decisions, not market forces, are
“capable of deciding what uses of spectrum are
best for the public (FCC Working Paper, 1980).3
However, under this historically prevalent inter-
ference management regime, radio spectrum has
become a potentially scarce national resource.4
Until recently, reforming spectrum management
has been premised primarily upon enhancing
administrative tools and practices such as licensing
flexibility, technical standards and the re-
assignment of vacated frequencies, known as
“refarming.” However, with the increased demand
for spectrum and the appearance of innovative
and efficient technologies, the reform effort has
evolved toward a mix of market-based methods,
such as administered incentive prices for
government-held spectrum,5 auctions, spectrum
trading, the creation of spectrum commons where
unlicensed spectrum is made available, and
spectrum sharing using advanced radio
technologies.6 Economic considerations are
receiving greater priority, with international
support. For example, the International
Telecommunications Union has noted:  
“As the frequency spectrum is a scarce resource,
decisions concerning spectrum management
should also consider the economic point of
view. Therefore, to improve national spectrum
management all available means including




There are two principal spectrum management
frameworks: administrative or market based.
Under the administrative approach, the regulator
makes decisions how spectrum is used and who
uses it, usually based on criteria relating to
perceived strength of demand, economic and
social benefits, and technical efficiency. Under a
market-based approach, firms decide through a
commercial process how spectrum gets used,
subject to broad technical and free-market rules.
The International Telecommunications Union
The international framework for the use of the
radio frequency spectrum is set out in a treaty
among the member states of the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU), a specialized
UN agency. The ITU has performed the
leading role in ensuring technical compatibility
and coordination of global system spectrum
C.D. Howe Institute
2 Industry Canada has a strong international reputation as a leading spectrum management organization, especially in the area of satellite
communications. Canada’s willingness to share  what it has learned with developing countries has helped bolster this reputation. 
3 As one commentator has stated, regulatory “public-interest” determinations suffer from a lack of transparency and are likely to reward the human-
capital of the decision-makers (Hazlett 2008). 
4 From 1900-1950 there was a one-million-fold increase in the intensity of spectrum use and from 1950-2000 another one-million-fold increase.
“Cooper’s Law,” named after the inventor of the hand-held cellular phone, projects that wireless communications capacity doubles every 2.5 years
and each bandwidth breakthrough stimulates additional wireless applications.
5 Administrative Incentive Prices (AIP), discussed later, are additional tools to promote efficiency in spectrum use within a framework of
administrative spectrum management. Licences are issued administratively but carry with them an obligation to make a payment to the regulator
or government to promote efficient spectrum use – not simply to recover spectrum management costs. The idea is that if a user has unused
spectrum, it will choose to return it rather than pay the charge. Also, if a user can pay a lower fee by using spectrum more efficiently, that user may
adopt more spectrum-efficient operations.
6 The use of the spectrum commons involving unlicensed (but not unregulated) use of frequencies has led to important innovations relating to
spread spectrum and low power applications such as Wi-Fi. The use of the spectrum commons is limited to certain bands representing a very small
portion of the overall spectrum below 15GHz. Commentary 303 | 3
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allocations7 for such purposes as broadcast, mobile
radio, cellular and satellite services.8 Allocation
decisions are made at the international and
national level after much consultation among
national regulators on the broad purpose or
purposes to which particular frequencies will be
put (known as making spectrum allocations on
either a primary or secondary basis). 
US Rules on Spectrum Relevant to Canada
Canada coordinates allocations and assignments
with the United States spectrum regulatory
authorities that include the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC)9 and the
National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA).10
The United States has moved in the direction of
flexible spectrum use, reflecting generally
liberalized practices. In 2002, the FCC’s Spectrum
Policy Task Force concluded that the
administrative model of regulation needed to be
largely replaced with increased use of market-
based mechanisms. The Task Force Report also
identified a key failing of spectrum policy – how
administrative rigidities prevent more efficient use
of this unique resource. 
The report’s other key recommendations
included:  
￿ providing the maximum-feasible flexibility for
licensees, limited only by interference concerns; and 
￿ increasing use of spectrum trading among
private spectrum holders,11 including the
ability to lease spectrum.
The United States has held the most spectrum
auctions (72) and the most  spectrum trades.12
The magnitude of annual spectrum trades in the
US – facilitated in part through a trading market
place and database – is significant in comparison
to recent auctions such as the FCC AWS auction.
A typical way of defining magnitudes in spectrum
is to estimate “MHz-pops,” or the amount of
bandwidth in megahertz13 times the population
covered by the licence. On average, 10 billion
MHz-pops of cellular spectrum trade annually
from 2003–2008.14 The AWS auction, which was
large in comparison to previous auctions, released
18 billion MHz-pops into the marketplace. The
US uses auctions and trading to improve access to
spectrum and efficiency of use.
7 An important clarification between spectrum allocations and spectrum assignments is helpful at this point. Spectrum allocations refer to the
various types of radio services and spectrum bands associated, ex ante, with the services prior to assigning to users specific frequencies within the
allocated bands. Allocations can be made on a primary or secondary basis. A user of a service that has a secondary allocation shall not cause
harmful interference to users of a primary service. Furthermore, bands are allocated for services such as broadcast and cellular, whereas
frequencies are assigned by way of licences to operators of those services. Assignments can be made on an exclusive or shared basis.
8 Good examples of how the international framework helps to coordinate frequency allocations include consistent frequencies for aeronautical,
mobile, radio and cellular communication services. GSM (Global System for Mobile) communications allows one to “roam” and make calls or
text messages while using cellphones outside of Canada. 
9 The FCC is responsible for managing non-government allocations and assignments, as well as spectrum use while the NTIA is responsible for
US federal government allocations and assignments and spectrum use.
10 Services where coordination takes place include broadcast (AM, FM, TV and the move towards digital services), cellular and microwave services.
At the spectrum allocation stage, broad decisions on use are made at global and regional ITU radiocommunication conferences. These
conferences are usually held every four years, and so the process can take time. For its part, Canada then prepares its own allocation, which
usually imposes further restrictions on spectrum. The overall time frame needed to allocate and assign spectrum to new services can easily take 10
years. 
11 Spectrum trading is a mechanism whereby rights and any associated obligations to use spectrum can be transferred from one party to another by
way of a market-based exchange.
12 The United States leads in auctions with over 70 followed by Australia with 35, New Zealand with 10. Meanwhile Canada had conducted seven
spectrum auctions by 2009.
13 As the number of MHz of a spectrum block increases, the greater the capacity of that block.
14 Source: FCC ULS Database.15 The target was subsequently reduced to 55 percent, which will still represent a massive transfer of frequencies into the domain of markets.
16 The telecommunications policy for Canada is set out in Section 7 of the Telecommunications Act while the broadcasting policy is set out in Section
5 of the Broadcasting Act.
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The UK Experience 
The UK telecommunications regulator, Ofcom
(www.ofcom.org.uk), is a leading proponent of
moving to more market-based methods. With
respect to auctions, Ofcom stated in its 2004
Spectrum Framework Review that:
Auctions are now used as the preferred
competitive means for assigning spectrum in
many countries. Auctions solve the most
pressing problems for many of the regulators –
they allow spectrum to be assigned where
demand significantly exceeded supply in a way
that is demonstrably transparent and far less
prone to legal challenge than the alternatives.
However, auctions without liberalisation,
(liberalisation involves giving greater flexibility
in how spectrum is used by a user), cannot let
the market decide on the most appropriate use
for spectrum. (Ofcom 2004.) 
Ofcom goes further by adding:
[Ofcom envisions]…allowing market forces to
prevail through the implementation of trading
and liberalisation where possible [by]... fully
implementing these policies in around 72 per
cent of the spectrum.15
Current Spectrum Policy in Canada
Goals
In Canada, responsibility for management of the
spectrum lies with Industry Canada through its
minister (hereafter referred to as the Minister).
The enabling legislation by which the spectrum is
managed is the Radiocommunication Act, (here-
after referred to as the Act). The Act sets out the
powers of the Minister with regard to planning
allocations and uses of spectrum, assignment of
spectrum to users by way of licensing, other
related authorizations and control of interference,
etc. The objectives of other relevant legislation –
the Telecommunications Act and the Broadcasting
Act – are to be taken into account by the Minister
when regulating spectrum use. The Minister is
also required to ensure the integrity and
functionality of the telecommuni-cation
infrastructure pursuant to provisions developed
under the Emergency Preparedness Act.
In the broadcasting sector, the Canadian Radio-
television and Telecommunications Commission
(CRTC) authorizes and regulates radio and
television broadcast undertakings for which the
Minister issues a broadcasting certificate.16
The Minister is also required to ensure the
integrity and functionality of the
telecommunications infrastructure pursuant to
provisions developed under the Emergency
Preparedness Act. High-level policy objectives are
not set out in the Radiocommunication Act.
Rather, the department’s Spectrum Policy
Framework (SPF) states the primary objective as
being, “To maximize the economic and social
benefits that Canadians derive from the use of the
radio frequency spectrum resource” (Industry
Canada 2007).
To meet this objective, the SPF goes on to state
the enabling guidelines, which emphasize the need
to employ markets, facilitate spectrum trading and
the development of property rights subject to the
overriding concern of regulating in the “public
interest.” Specifically, the policy framework states: 
￿ market forces should be relied upon to the
maximum extent feasible;
￿ spectrum should be made available to support
Canadian sovereignty, security and public
safety needs; 
￿ spectrum policy and management should
support the efficient functioning of markets by:
(i) permitting the flexible use of spectrum to
the greatest extent possible;
(ii) harmonizing spectrum use with interna-
tional allocations and standards, except
where Canadian interests warrant a different
determination; (iii) facilitating secondary markets for spectrum
authorizations;
(iv) clearly defining the obligations and privileges
conveyed in spectrum authorizations; and
￿ notwithstanding the above, spectrum should be
made available for a range of services that are in
the public interest.
Industry Canada’s Role
Domestically and within the international
framework described above, Industry Canada
through the Minister also sets the policy and
regulates the use of radio spectrum, something
usually avoided in larger economies.17 At the
highest level, Industry Canada does this largely
through its Canadian Table of Frequency
Allocations, which sets out what radio services
can use which frequency bands and under what
conditions. These conditions of use vary
widely, from inflexibly reserving particular
frequencies for uses that are specified in detail
to providing considerable freedom for parti-
cular bands or services.
With respect to reform and innovation taking
place elsewhere, Industry Canada in developing
the Policy Framework for the AWS Spectrum
Auction noted “that other countries with
competitive wireless markets, notably the U.S. and
the U.K., have taken and continue to take
measures to facilitate access to spectrum resources
and market entry” (Industry Canada 2007).
It is worth pointing out that a prominent
federal review panel of telecommunications policy
recommended changes to the supervision of
spectrum policy in Canada. According to the
2006 Telecommunications Policy Review Panel
Report, the authority to regulate Canada’s radio
spectrum and to license its use should be
transferred from Industry Canada to the CRTC.
The purview of Industry Canada is huge,
cutting across most industry sectors. Usually,
telecommunications and spectrum management
reform takes a back seat to other government
priorities. Sometimes, though, the issues are very
much in the forefront as was the recent case
involving conflicting regulatory decisions by
Industry Canada and the CRTC over the licensing
of Globalive Wireless Management Corp. as a new
wireless incumbent. A CRTC decision to bar
Globalive from obtaining an operating licence was
later overturned by the Federal Cabinet.
What Are the Objectives of Spectrum
Auctions?
In our research, we evaluated different
telecommunications regulators’ handling of
auctions (Table 1). One of the poorest is the first-
come, first-served approach that assigns available
spectrum to users in the order they request
frequencies. Lottery-based spectrum assignments
that, at first hand, may seem equitable have many
drawbacks and have fallen out of favour. One of
their principal drawbacks is that they attract rent-
seekers who enter the lottery but have no real
intention to utilize assigned spectrum. Another
problematic method is the so-called beauty
contest, also known as comparative review, which
involves the regulator deciding who best deserves a
spectrum assignment. Such allocations are often
opaque and do not allocate spectrum to those who
value it the most.
In our view, auctions best support the main
regulatory objectives of technical and economic
efficiency.18 Auctions, particularly, represent
regulatory best practice for assigning high-value
spectrum rights such as cellular and broadcast19
because:
Commentary 303 | 5
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
17 Canadian and Japanese spectrum regulators remain within government ministries whereas other G7 countries established independent spectrum
regulators prior to 1999.
18  Technical efficiency refers to maximum utilization of radio spectrum by avoiding interference or large gaps between assigned frequencies,  whereas
economic efficiency refers to maximizing the value of outputs obtained by use of radio spectrum.
19 Auctions are now being used to effectively assign small, less-valuable spectrum packages such as the recently completed BWA Residual Spectrum
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￿ prices set at spectrum auctions are compara-
tively free from political influence and
collusion;
￿ auctions are comparatively fast in delivering a
result;
￿ operators themselves set the spectrum price
rather than the price being set by the regulator,
although the regulator can greatly influence
prices through selection of auction method;
￿ market prices can encourage rapid rollout of
services by requiring competing operators to
quickly extend coverage to generate cash-flow
(assuming effective competition takes place);
and,
￿ sound economic principles related to consumer
welfare and investment are applied when
spectrum is in the hands of those who value it
most highly.
In addition to meeting the main objective of
achieving an efficient, timely and dispute-free
assignment of scarce spectrum when the demand
for spectrum exceeds supply, spectrum auctions 
in Canada meet objectives such as supporting
sovereignty, harmonization and competition. 
Support Canadian Sovereignty
Industry Canada through auction eligibility
criteria and usage rules can take steps to influence
how Canadian or foreign-owned entities use
strategic spectrum resources.20 One simple way to
improve competition is by loosening foreign
ownership restrictions. Canada is one of the few
OECD countries placing such restrictions in the
telecommunications sector.21 No less an authority
than the Competition Bureau has expressed the
view that foreign ownership restrictions represent
a considerable and sometimes insurmountable
barrier to entry. “They have served their purpose
and are no longer necessary to harmonize
Canadian policy with that of our global trading
partners” (Competition Bureau, 2007). 
Indeed, other countries appear to manage
foreign ownership without compromising either
security or customer interests. In our view, foreign
ownership should play no role in spectrum
allocations. For example, in the United Kingdom
the parent companies of the five mobile operators
are headquartered in France, Germany, Hong
Kong, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
20 The recent government decision to license Globalive as a new wireless telecommunications service provider centred on resolving the issue of
Canadian control, not spectrum usage.
21 The only OECD countries with foreign ownership requirements that apply to all companies in the sector are Canada, Korea and Mexico. It is
further noted that a Canadian Parliamentary Committee and two expert panels have recommended easing foreign ownership restrictions, but
nothing has happened (see OECD Communications Outlook, 2009).
Objectives First come/First served
or Direct Award Lottery Beauty Contest Auction
Efficient assignment of spectrum Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Very Likely
Promote downstream competition Poor Poor Poor Good
Effective and transparent process Poor – Good Good Very Poor Good
Minimum risk of litigation Poor Good Very Poor Good
Raising revenue to reflect scarcity Poor Poor Poor Excellent
Table 1: Comparison of Spectrum Allocation Methods
Source: InterConnect Communications Limited 2008Commentary 303 | 7
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Harmonization
Spectrum packages can be structured to ensure
spectrum is used in ways that ensure compatibility
with global network systems and that Canadians
benefit from economies of scale.
The recent Canadian AWS (2.1 GHz) auction
and the US 700 MHz auction are prime examples
of plans harmonized between Canada and the
United States, both in spectrum availability and
packaging. These auctions achieved the explicit
goals of economies of scale and coordination of
cross-border services that benefited Canadian
consumers. 
Competition
Spectrum is an essential element of many high-
value commercial and public services for which
there are not good wireline substitutes. It follows
that a company that controls the necessary
spectrum also controls the downstream service
sold to end-users. Hence, improving access to
spectrum reduces barriers to entry into existing
and new markets.
Since Industry Canada regulates spectrum
access through licensing, it has the key role in
lifting the access barrier, subject to domestic and
international allocations. There are, however,
several other ways in which competition among
service providers can be achieved, such as the
intervention of mobile virtual network operators
(MVNOs)22 who purchase access to a wireless
network’s minutes on a wholesale basis and resell
them to consumers. Such a system can create a
form of competition, providing benefits to end-
users from direct spectrum licensing to operators. 
In a competitive environment, auctions
combined with technology-neutral licensing and
service-neutral licensing ensure that resources are
efficiently assigned and applied to the introduc-
tion of services that benefit end-users. However, 
if the services market is inadequately competitive,
the incumbents can use the auction to exclude
further competition. 
Evaluation Framework 
Whether auctions effectively promote policy goals
should be evaluated from both theoretical and
practical perspectives. 
The Theory
A useful and standard way of evaluating the
effectiveness of auctions or any other method of
resource allocation is to ask:
￿ Do auctions promote economy in production?
(In the case of spectrum, this would involve
asking if some users wasted spectrum.) 
￿ Do auctions promote the production of the
right set of goods and services? (For example, is
spectrum available to produce the services that
end-users want?)
￿ Do auctions promote innovation? (In other
words, is spectrum available for new
services?)23
Markets, in general, permit the free exchange of
labour and land, goods and services, as well as
physical, financial and intellectual assets among the
households, firms and public organizations in the
economy. Because transactions are based on free
exchange, markets do not – unlike administrative
allocation methods – entail hierarchies with
‘deciders’ and ‘implementers’ (although firms
operating in a market economy do exhibit such
hierarchies internally).24 From this theoretical
standpoint, auctions are more effective.
22 MVNOs are operators that combine their own retail mobile telephony and customer management assets and capabilities with the access and
network technologies and spectrum of a traditional wireless operator. Examples of this in Canada include Koodoo (on the Telus network), Fido (on
the Rogers network) and Virgin Mobile (on the Bell network).
23 The three underlying resource allocation themes are technical, allocative and dynamic efficiency.
24 Markets are capable of accommodating general restrictions on anti-competitive behaviour and particular consumer protection measures.| 8 Commentary 303
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The Practice
While auction theory is a triumph of the
application of economic theory to economic
practice, it has not, in practice, been an unalloyed
success. There are numerous examples of famously
failed and flawed auctions.25 Some of the problems
include: auctions that appear to be flawlessly
designed but are subject to political interference
(preferences and reserve prices); the failure to
perceive the importance of the interaction of
auctions among different countries; and bad advice
given by experts who fail to take into account their
client’s history and strategies (e.g., dominant
providers compelled to defend their turf).
There have been spectacular failures in terms of
opening bid prices for spectrum, stipulated by the
regulator, being set too high. A combination of
factors such as inadequate spectrum packages,
inappropriate reserve prices, unrealistic expectations
by bidders, flawed bidding rules, strategic bidding
and collusion by participants can and have caused
an auction to fail. Excessive service obligations
imposed on successful bidders in terms of rollout
can also lead to failed auctions and operations. 
CANADIAN AWS AUCTION RESULTS: Industry
Canada completed an auction over the
summer of 2008 where 105 MHz of highly
valuable spectrum, divided into six blocks for
use in advanced wireless mobile services, was
offered to two groups – incumbents that
desired added spectrum and new entrants.
After starting with nearly 300 initial bids in
May 2008, the AWS auction concluded in
Round 331 on July 21, 2008. 
Industry Canada had several straightforward
goals in mind with the auction:
￿ increase competition to the benefit of
consumers;
￿ ease entry by providing a set-aside for qualified
new entrants; and
￿ earn a fair return for Canadian bidders.
Our review of results and the bidding activity
points to several patterns and behaviours:
1. Bell, TELUS and Rogers, which dominate
the Canadian cellular market, won all of the
assignments in the top five markets in the
open blocks (Blocks A, E, and F). They bid
$1.74 billion for 41 percent of the total
amount bid ($4.177 billion) for all licences
in Blocks A – F  (see Appendix A for details
of the auctions). The bidding for these
assignments concluded early in the auction
and was essentially over by round 30;
2. Bidders were most interested in the top five
markets in Blocks A – F which accounted for
72 of all bids made ($3.033 billion out of
$4.177 billion);
3. As could be expected, incumbents largely bid
strategically to protect existing markets by
preventing new entrants from gaining a
spectrum footprint in the A, E and F bands
(the open bands). Rogers dominates Block A,
and Bell and TELUS together dominate
Blocks E and F;26
4. Assignments for new entrants within the set-
aside blocks (Blocks  B, C and D) ended up
being quite fragmented with some areas of
regional concentration;
5. One bidder, Globalive, bid the second
highest overall to obtain a 10 MHz footprint
in Toronto (Block B – $279 million).
Globalive was to prove unsuccessful in
obtaining a similar 10 MHz footprint in any
other major city and is limited to 5 MHz 
in important markets such as Vancouver,
Calgary, Winnipeg and Ottawa.27
It remains to be seen how this will affect 
its business model. 
Industry Canada unquestionably succeeded in
conducting an auction over a relatively short
period of time, which has led to few disputes,
25 For an interesting primer on auction theory, design and examples of auctions failures and how auction theory can be abused refer to Klemperer’s
very readable Auctions: Theory and Practice.
26 Industry Canada AWS Blocks A, E, and F auction files were reviewed. Bell, Rogers and Telus were awarded spectrum by bidding highest in the top
five markets (by population). See Appendix A. 
27 Although imminent technologies such as Long Term Evolution (LTE) can use both five and 10 MHz bands, having more spectrum assigned allows
for better performance in terms of cost and speed, which ultimately drives consumer satisfaction and quality of service. Commentary 303 | 9
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while bringing new entrants into several key
markets and raising significant new revenues for
the federal government. 
Probably the most controversial element was the
use of set-asides for new entrants. This issue is
addressed in an article prepared for European
spectrum and telecommunications regulators
(Cave, forthcoming). The argument against set-
asides is that in a fully mature spectrum market
regime, it is probably unnecessary or even harmful
to intervene to promote competition by such
mechanisms. 
With a technological- and service-neutral
spectrum market covering a substantial number of
mobile communications frequencies from 400
MHz to 3.5 GHz, spectrum availability should
not be a barrier to entry. However, many countries
now moving toward a market-based spectrum
approach may be restrained by past, possibly
dysfunctional, policies. As an illustration, the
mobile market in Canada is often characterized as
a tight oligopoly, which some experts say has
served consumers poorly. 
Where past administrative practice has generated
inequalities in spectrum holdings, an appropriate
regulatory response may be to impose spectrum
caps, or limits to the amount of spectrum that can
be held, which prevent the best endowed operators
from extending their dominance. The European
spectrum and telecommunications regulators note
that “caps at spectrum awards are thus seen by some
as offering an effective form of intervention which
can, under the right circumstances, benefit end users
(ERG-RSPG 2009).” Thus, the UK government
intends to impose spectrum caps on the prospective
“digital dividend” (UK, 2009). Other European
spectrum regulators, in the Netherlands for
example, are also turning to this approach. 
Where past regulatory policy (in Canada’s case,
both spectrum and foreign ownership restrictions)
has imposed an artificial brake on entry, a different
approach may be required. In such circumstances,
there is risk that a standard auction will produce an
outcome of no change: all available spectrum will
be acquired by existing operators. 
The use of set-asides in the AWS auction was a
means, available within a very limited time period,
of introducing new players into the market,
leading to the prospect of enduring benefits for
consumers. Absent the set-asides, these benefits
might not have been possible. Even with them,
they may not materialize. The application of the
policy was a judgment call, the correctness of
which cannot yet be evaluated. But while such
measures should not be necessary in the long run,
they can help during the transition of the market
from a highly regulated status quo to a better and
more competitive future.
Improving auction design is only a partial answer
to the fundamental underlying problems. An auction
delivers a once-and-for-all assignment of spectrum to
those who believe they can use it most profitably, but
it lacks a mechanism for constant adjustments to the
ownership and use of frequencies necessary to ensure
continuous innovation. Administrative methods
worked well for decades, but now they account for
the gridlock problem.
Options for Reform
We consider two proposals to alleviate Canadian
spectrum gridlock: reducing scarcity and
improving access. The first involves spectrum
pricing to promote efficient use and the second
involves the creation of markets based on the free
exchange and flexibility in the use of spectrum. 
Pricing Spectrum Increases Availability
Studies in other jurisdictions have shown that
significant amounts of allocated and assigned
radio spectrum are underutilized. A 2005
spectrum audit conducted for the UK government
found that government departments and entities
held approximately 50 percent of the spectrum
below 15 GHz28 with significant evidence of
underuse.29 Several policy measures were taken
subsequent to the study to reduce the amount of
spectrum held by the government and to increase
28 This is the area of the usable spectrum that facilitates most cellular transmission.
29 As reported in the Independent Audit of Spectrum Holdings submitted in 2005 by Prof. Martin Cave to the UK government (often referred to as
the Cave Audit), UK government holdings of spectrum approximate 50 percent of all of the spectrum below 15GHz.| 10 Commentary 303
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the efficient use of spectrum that remained in the
hands of all users, including the government. 
First, specific targets and time frames were
established for auditing and planning the release
of spectrum from government hands. Secondly,
prices (known as administrative incentive prices or
AIP) were attached to use of the spectrum. These
prices were explicitly intended to reflect the
scarcity of the spectrum, not the administrative
costs of managing it.
AIP thus reflect the opportunity cost for spectrum
in a particular use compared to alternative uses.
They ensure that all radio spectrum are priced,
regardless of who uses it, and that spectrum is priced
at a level that serves to encourage efficient use. By
combining targets with better pricing, radio
spectrum becomes available and is used efficiently
(see Ofcom 2009 for an evaluation). 
What Model of Spectrum Management Is Best?
We have already pointed out that the traditional
administrative method assumes that the
regulator/spectrum manager plays a direct role in
assigning the spectrum to users and in choosing the
technology and service model for how the spectrum
is accessed and used. This is in contrast to using
spectrum markets to ensure spectrum assignment is
decentralized to market forces – those that use it
make those decisions.
In a spectrum market, radio spectrum itself
becomes tradable. Licences are treated as private
property, and the licensee has control over who is
allowed to share that spectrum. An important aspect
of the spectrum property right is the duration of the
licence term. The duration choice involves
compromises between two competing public-policy
outcomes: firstly, the desire to maintain uninter-
rupted investment incentives so as to eliminate
disincentives to invest toward the end of a licence
period; and secondly, the regulator’s ability to
influence spectrum use and, if necessary, to redefine
property rights to accommodate new technologies.
The trade-off noted above between investment
incentives and sovereignty can be resolved by giving
the regulator, in the case of long or infinite licence
duration, powers, subject to specific conditions, to
re-acquire licences by compulsory purchase. These
powers might be exercisable in cases of:
￿ a security, defence or other national emergency;
￿ a need to redefine spectrum user rights to
accommodate new technologies such as ultra-
wide band (UWB) and cognitive radio;30 and
￿ a change in international agreements or treaties.
The regulator’s mandatory acquisition of
spectrum would have to be accompanied in all
cases by an economic cost-benefit analysis and a
demonstration that the benefit of the technology
could not be attained by ordinary commercial
transactions among rights holders.31
In addition to obtaining flexible exclusive rights
and longer terms of licence duration, primary users
(licensees) clearly benefit from strong interference
protection for their exclusive use.32The core
characteristics for exclusive-use licences are that
they must be tradable and amenable to division and
aggregation. Tradable licences have several
30 The ITU defines UWB in terms of a transmission from an antenna for which the emitted signal bandwidth exceeds the lesser of 500 MHz or 20
percent of the centre frequency. Due to the extremely low emission levels currently allowed by regulatory agencies, UWB systems tend to be short-
range and indoor applications. Cognitive radio refers to new technologies that “sense” other frequency users and automatically vacate the spectrum
for unused spectrum.
31 Spectrum valuation studies are periodically conducted by regulators when comparing the value of specific spectrum bands in alternative uses. AIP,
which was described earlier as a means to “price” spectrum, can offer an indication of spectrum value in alternative uses. 
32 The reference to this regulatory approach as “exclusive use” reveals a high level of confusion by policymakers. For example, cellular band allocations
are some of the most intensely shared frequencies (measured in net economic value generated). No one bids billions of dollars for licences to obtain
“exclusive use,” but they do to exercise “exclusive rights” so as to enable diverse non-exclusive spectrum access for subscribers, application providers,
technology suppliers, and rival networks. For example, in Canada innovators like Research in Motion (RIM) or Apple contract for access to
wireless networks. Their products such as BlackBerries and iPhones then deliver wireless functionality to millions of customers despite being
developed by firms lacking licences or other spectrum assets.
In RIM’s case, it effectively buys tiny frequency slices, bundled with wireless network connectivity, in bulk from mobile carriers. RIM’s BlackBerry
customers are then able to consume billions of minutes of network access. RIM produces and sells radio devices (BlackBerries) and maintains
computer networks that route content (in particular, email messages) to and from mobile carriers, which then relay this valuable content to
BlackBerry users. Subscription revenue is then split between RIM and the carrier.beneficial implications. First, if licence ownership is
subject to transfer, then it is continuously possible
for market forces to provide incentives for spectrum
to be allocated to its highest value use. Whatever
the use, it will reflect true opportunity cost.
Together, these factors produce powerful incentives
to use spectrum efficiently. Second, the more
spectrum that is tradable in this way, the more
liquid will be secondary markets and the lower will
be the average opportunity cost or scarcity rents
associated with access rights. Encouraging spectrum
prices to be as low as possible, consistent with
aggregate demand and supply factors, will enable
low-cost access for new applications and services,
clearly a major goal of spectrum reform. 
With respect to aggregation, there may need to
be controls to protect against the creation of undue
market power by a small number of firms who may
act to deny rivals access to spectrum. A regulatory
upper limit on the amount of spectrum acquired by
dominant market players (spectrum caps) is one
mechanism for protecting against excess
aggregation. If spectrum caps are adopted, they
should be relatively loose (sometimes referred to as
adjustable or soft caps) and should be linked to
other findings of market power.33
Nobel economics laureate Ronald Coase’s critique
of the legacy model of regulation anticipated and
outlined the basic elements of a spectrum market
based on well-defined property rights. But it took
three decades before his suggestions began to be put
into effect (Coase, 1959).34
A future where market processes are pure and
unfettered is unrealistic, since any market will
inevitably be subject to some form of regulation. The
real estate market is quite open and serves as a useful
analogy. Real estate markets include a mix of
different frameworks for ownership (government and
commercial; public and private) and uses encum-
bered by various obligations (i.e., responsibilities not
to pollute) and limitations (i.e., zoning bylaws, rights
of way and restrictive covenants). 
As well, the need to manage legacy transition
issues, protect against harmful interference and
promote the public interest will require ongoing
regulation. However, relative to the traditional
framework, we should be better off when
regulation becomes less administrative and more
market-based, relying on general competition law,
bargaining and adjudication processes to manage a
well-defined framework of rights (Coase 1960).
How can Canada Improve its model of
Spectrum Management?
A significant part of spectrum is used to provide
services that are clearly in the public interest. These
services have traditionally been allocated by admin-
istrative methods. Administrative methods were a
viable way of managing and assigning spectrum in
the past but there are doubts about whether the
approach remains necessary or efficient. Government
can improve efficiency and access if it puts a price on
spectrum and allows permit trading and the disposal
of any surpluses. As well, organizations producing
services in the public interest should be required to
prepare for more output, as needed, and be
responsible for acquiring (and given the means to
acquire) the necessary spectrum at market prices. 
The government’s use of radio spectrum to
provide services similar to those provided by the
private sector should, at a minimum, be subject to
market prices or opportunity cost. Moreover, these
services should be tradable in secondary markets. 
A foreseeable exception is government’s use of
spectrum to meet national security needs and
international treaty commitments. This spectrum is
not likely to become subject to market-based
assignments but should be subject to market prices. 
Commentary 303 | 11
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
33 There are several problems with spectrum caps. Should they always apply? and for how long? The regulator typically can waive soft caps if, for
example, they prevent an operator from deploying innovative low-cost services. Useful information on spectrum caps can be found in Little’s
“Mobile Broadband, Competition and Spectrum Caps.” 
34 Coase’s discussion of  spectrum allocation was the precursor of his more general demonstration that bargaining among agents could lead to efficient
outcomes despite the presence of externalities, if private property rights were well defined and the costs of bargaining were zero. Subsequent
literature has explored a variety of factors which effect whether private bargaining can eliminate inefficiencies from externalities, including the
nature and impact of positive transactions costs, the impact of different structures of property rights, the interaction of taxes and bargaining, the
possibility that some participants possess private information, the effect of no convexities and the implications of endogenous participation. The
bargaining he described is often referred to “Coasian bargaining.” In a spectrum context, it would mean that parties could trade on a bilateral or
multilateral basis to optimize their combined returns from the frequencies they jointly possess.| 12 Commentary 303
Having a well-defined framework of usage rights
will be an important step to enable market-based
assignment. The exclusive-use licence defines the
rights to occupy a given block of spectrum.
Primary users have a presumptive right to exclude
other users from occupying their frequencies.
Secondary users may have the right to occupy the
frequency if they can do so without causing
interference to primary users, although they have
no interference protection rights of their own.
The question of how best to manage shared
access to the radio frequency spectrum while
providing appropriate interference protection is
important for all users. The focus of spectrum
management should, therefore, be on providing
adequate protection in a market framework or, in
some cases, a spectrum commons. 
The goal of licensing reform should be to strip
away all aspects of the administrative regime that
are not related to interference management in a
market-allocation framework. Prime examples for
elimination are buildout or rollout requirements
for licences and service or technical restrictions
that are not consistent with and motivated by
interference protection.35
The steps taken by Industry Canada to allow
transferability of spectrum since its 2007 review
represent an improvement, but are only an
incremental change relative to the sort of divisibility
and transferability anticipated in the reforms
recommended here (see Industry Canada 2009).
However, within the more restrictive current frame-
work, the revised licensing procedures leave much to
be desired. Generally, they apply only to Personal
Communication Service (1900 MHz) and cellular
licences (AWS) awarded by auction, and other
licences on a case-by-case basis. The procedures that
allow Industry Canada to review every transfer can
impose uncertainty, unnecessary bureaucratic delays
and costs, thereby increasing spectrum-access
transaction costs and hamper the sort of flexibility
and secondary trading that the reform is designed 
to enable. 
With respect to duration, Canadian spectrum
licences typically have a 10-year time span and a
10-year extension with a reasonable expectation of
renewal beyond these 20 years. The choice of an
expiry date, be it five, 10 or 20 years hence, is
always somewhat arbitrary. 
An argument in favour of granting longer or
perpetual spectrum usage rights is that investment
occurs in stages, and each investment has a
different payback period. Regulators and the
public at large have difficulty placing complete
trust in unfettered market forces. Therefore, the
regulatory authority usually retains the option of
withdrawing spectrum usage rights. In our view,
longer-term arrangements (15 to 20 years), on
balance, are more favourable as they offer better
investment incentives and involve a clearer
definition of a licensee’s rights.
Recommendations
We have several policy recommendations:36
1. The Canadian government should recognize that
efficient spectrum management is crucial to the
country’s economic prosperity. Although senior
ministers and public servants may find it challen-
ging, it is essential that they understand what is at
stake. As discussed in the sections of this paper
on spectrum policy goals and outcomes, auctions
will achieve the best outcome for spectrum users.
2. Radio spectrum, like other inputs into produc-
tive processes in a market  economy, should
carry a price that ensures that all users – public
and private sector alike – use it effectively. As we
have noted, the United Kingdom has implemen-
ted such a pricing scheme. The Canadian
government could begin such a process through
consultations and preparation of a draft policy
statement. 
3. Canada should specifically adopt policy directives
leading to the implementation of secondary
markets, enabling spectrum trading along with
flexible user rights. Both the experience elsewhere
and economic theory show that such tradability
will improve how spectrum is used.
C.D. Howe Institute
35 Limiting choice of 3G to W-CDMA  for a new band would be a mistake since this is not required to protect interference. Another example
would be a band plan consideration such as bandwidth, which  can limit the licensee’s choice in technology.
36 For each of these main recommendations more detailed guidance is provided in a study prepared by the authors (see Industry Canada 2007).Commentary 303 | 13
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Successful Open Block Bidders in the Top Five Markets
Price Price Price
City Block A 10 MHz ($millions) Block E 5 MHz ($millions) Block F 10 MHz ($millions)
Toronto Rogers $235 Telus $103 Bell $314
Montreal Rogers $192 Bell $128 Telus $234
Vancouver Rogers $117 Bell $62.1 Telus $117
Ottawa Rogers $46.5 Bell $33.2 Telus $44.6
Edmonton/Calgarya Rogers $35.4 Bell $19.2 Telus $57.4
Successful Closed Block (for New Entrants only) Bidders in the Top Five Markets
Price Price Price
City Block B 10 MHz ($millions) Block C 5 MHz ($millions) Block D 5 MHz ($millions)
Toronto Globalive $279 Delta Audio Video $131 Quebecor $96.6
Montreal Quebecor $168 Quebecor $112 Quebecor $96.4
British Columbia 1380057 Alta Ltd $101 Globalive $67.4 Delta Audio Video $56.4
Eastern Ontario Quebecor $51.9 Delta Audio Video $30.4 Globalive $27.1
Saskatchewan/
Winnipegb Sasktel $40.4 Sasktel $24.2 Globalive $13.5
a Edmonton was the top five market for Blocks A and E. Calgary was the top five market for Block F.
b Saskatchewan was the top five market for Blocks B and C. Winnipeg was the top five market for Block D.
Source: Industry Canada.
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